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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERLIN JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I Case No. 
( 12602 
The facts of the within case are simple and uncon-
troverted, and they are that an oral agreement was entered 
into between the Plaintiff, (Respondent) and the Defend-
ant, which agreement was de::;cribed in three letters, from 
the Defendant (Ex. P-1, 2, 3) and in concise term3 was: 
The plaintiff was engaged by the defendant to do remodel-
ing and repair work on a building which the plaintiff pro-
posed to lease. And also that the plaintiff would do certain 
repair work on an adjoining portion of the same building 
which the defendant was leasing to someone else, (Brad-
shaw Auto Parts). That the defendant agreed with the 
plaintiff to pay him $3.50 per hour for the said repair 
work and remodeling, both in the area to be rented by the 
plaintiff and in that portion of the building rented to 
others (Ex. P-1). 
The labor supplied to the rental part of the unit at 
$3.50 per hourwas $1,093.57 (T 56 - 20). The number of 
hours per day and the days of the monrth thwt the labor wa; 
performed was detailed in tes,timony (T 50 - 19) and (Ex-
P-6). The plaintiff furnished materials and supplies u;,ed 
in the remodeling which were also itemized by each invoice 
number and sale.:: slip from Peter,~on Machine Co., and 
which materials and suppJ:e:; totaled $708.71 (T63-22) (Ex. 
P-7). The p'.aintiff aLo provided repairs and improve-
ments to unit of the building rented by others, which de- . 
fendant (appellant) stipulatE:d to be the sum of $179.16. 
(T 57-7) That the total amount due the p'.a nti~'f ~r rn 
the defendant on the unit to be rented by the plaintiff ms 
and i3 $1,093.57 fr.r labor; $708.71 for mate1ia's; a:~.J f1c 
sum of $179.lG fer improvement.:> to other portion of de-
fendant's building by plaintiff. Accordringly, the defend-
ant owed the plaintiff $1,980.87 as a result of labor and 
materials, per their oral agreement, which oral agreement 
was supported by defendant's written correspondence and 
other documents. (Ex. P-1, 2, 3, 4, & 5.) 
The plaintiff rented the rental unit frcm the defend· 
ant with paymenh to begin February 1, 1969 (Ex. P-3, 
Par. 2, line 3) an<l concluded with eviction and the clear:. 
being locked on May 19, 1969, while the plaintiff w~s laid . 
up with injuries. That the agreed rent was $140.00 per 
month. The parties agreed that one-half of the mrnthly 
rental ( $70.00 per month) would be credited by the repair 
and improvementi:: m'lde. Defendant wa' to pay the plain· 
tiff in cash for the repairs and improvements ( $179.16) 
to the auto partR building and motel unit. The clefendant 
•) 
was to pay plaintiff for materials used at cost plus 10% 
(708.71). The defendant was billed for such improve-
ments and materials on Mar. 20, 1969, on April 2, 1969. 
April 6, 1969 and April 9, 1969, none of which was paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff (T 61 - line 20-30). Sub-
~equently plaintiff credited the amount due as rental on 
the building and offset the payment as follows: 
Total rental due Defendant 
One-half rental due in cash 
Labor on Auto Parts Bldg., & Motel 
Difference due Defendant 
Total materials purchased from Peter-
son Machine Co. for Defendant's 
bldg., cost plus 10% 
Balance due in cash on rental to 
Defendant 
Net balance due Plaintiff from 
supplies 
Plus Plaintiff's labor on rental unit 
Less one-half rental due in work 
Total amount due Plaintiff 
$490.00 
245.00 
179.18 
65.82 
708.71 
65.82 
$642.89 
1093.57 
1736.46 
245.00 
$1491.46 
The plaintiff testified as to the actual hours of work 
performed and a <lay by da\Y itemized account of each day 
of labor wac; furnished the defendant. At the trial plain-
tiff presented three expert witnesses ( T 104 - Mr. Framp-
ton, T 114 - Mr. Vernon Peterson, T 133 - Mr. Brooks And-
erson), which wai::. corroboration of the work performed 
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as shown under plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Supplies including 
invoice numbers from Peterson's Machine Company were 
contained on Exhibit P-7 and corrooorated by testimony 
of Lowell Peterson (T 108). 
JURY VERDICT 
The jury rendered verdict in the sum of $1,229.00 for 
repairs, improvements and remodeling performed by the 
plaintiff at the instance and request of the defendant, and 
offset the payment by the sum of $490.00 for rent due and 
unpaid, with a net verdict of $739.00. Evidence justified 
the jury crediting Defendant for $58, because of in-
voice error of $58, inste~d of $.58, and also crediting ('.c-
fendant for a ccunter and rug removed from the premises 
at defendant's request. 
There was ample and conclusive testimony to support 
the verdict of the jury. The testimony of the three expert 
witnesses, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Anderson and Mr. l.«ramprton, 
was not to change the theory from damages due on an oral 
contract to quantum meruit, but was supporting te3-
timony that the services and the materials had in fact been 
furnished, which repairs and which materials and supplies 
the witnesses observed and examined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF and DEFENDANT. 
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Ex. "P" 1, a letter from defendant to the plaintiff 
refers to an oral agreement in which the defendant states 
"This will be perfectly satisfaotory with me". P.S. "veri-
fying $3.50 per hour for labor and whole.,ale plus 10'/o for 
materials." Ex. "P" 2. Letter dated Jan. 27, 1969, from 
the defendant, is quoted as follows: "I had been waiting 
for some weeks, aR I told your wife the la;,t time I was up 
that I was agreeable to the time and materials suggestion, 
providing you would tell me what it was. You have nou.; 
told me and we understand each other". As I stated, I am 
perfectly willing to go ahead on that basi:o. I note you have 
pretty well put the back on the portion to the middle. We 
need to put in a partition in the front window which you 
started. I suggest you complete it, a:lso put in a partiition 
above the window by the ceiling and the top of the window. 
I need to have the rest of the partition on the south fin-
ished including hanging the door. I would be glad to pay 
you the $3.50 per hour if you will finish up the job." Fur-
ther quoting paragraph 3, "I suggest that you take the rest 
of the month to do the job and let the rent ftart on the 1st 
of February." Quoting from paragraph 5, "incidently, be-
sides finishing the partition, I need to have the re'::t of the 
wall on the inside perfa-taped as well as that which is put 
in the window. I will be glad to pay you for that if you 
will finish it up as I have been somewhat under the wea-
ther and it has been almost impossible for me to get this 
finished." 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 further confirms the agre€-
ment and acknowledges invoices for materials and 1:,upplies 
in the sum of $142.00. 
Paragraph No. 5 of Exhibit No. 4, written April 17, 
1969, is quoted, for the purpose of showing that the agree-
ment between the parties had continued with work and la-
bor being performed and supplie.s being furnished by the 
Plaintiff to April of 1969. Quoting from Par. 5, defend-
anrt states, "I have been very short th:s year due to the fact 
that rentalis for me were very bad last year, although it i~ 
working out fine now. But we must get on a basis where 
we can bill it once a month and I should have a full and 
total itemized b:Il for your work that you are claiming cre-
dit on, and of course I will give you credit on the work in 
other room..> such as 5, 13, etc." 
Paragraph 6 acknowledges receipt of invoices dated 
Mar. 1969. It is quoted as follows: "I note that the in-
voice dated Mar. 1969 is a general bill and if this is a full 
bHI rtlhen of course I am satisfied, if you are. In any event, 
let's get it straightened out right away so I will know 
where you are going." 
Pla:ntiff's Exhibit No. 6 is a day by day itemization 
delivered to the defendant by the plaint:ff of hours work 
by plaintiff on defendant's building, detaHing the number 
of hours per day and by whom the work was performed. 
The total labor includes 369 hours for a total amount 
of $1272.75. Materials and suppl'es are itemized by in-
voices and included on Plaintiff's Ex. No. 7. Each invoice 
from Peteron's Machine Ccmpany was examined by the 
defendant. The plaint'ff t2stified that each item was used 
in the repair and improvement of the defendant's prem-
ises and none was used ebewhere. 
The above referred to communication between Plain-
tiff and Defendant shows ccmplete meeting of the minds of 
the parLe-, constituting a valid contractual agreement. 
The primary test as to the actual character of a con-
tract according to authorities and as is cited in Am Jur 2d, 
Vu'. 17, pg. ~33, i..; quoted as follows: 
The primary test as to the actual character of a con-
tract is the intention of the parties, to be gathered 
from the whole scope and effect of the language 
used, and mere verbal formulas, if inconsistent with 
the real intention, are to be disregarded. It does 
not matter what name the parties chose to designate 
it. But the existence of a contract, the meeting of 
the minds, the intention to assume an obligation, and 
the understanding are to be determine<l in case of 
doubt not alone from the words used, but also the 
situation, acts, and conduct of the partie\ and the 
attendant circum~tances. 
Quoting further from Am Jur 2d Vol. 17, pg. 334-335, 
the following language is helpful in determining that an 
agTeement existed between the parties. 
Contracts are said to be either expres<, implied, or 
constructivf'. Contracts are expre3'3 when their 
terms are f:tated by the parties, and they are often 
said fo be implied when the:r terms are not so st?t-
ecl Thus. ::tn implie<l contract is one inferre<l frcm 
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the conduct of the parties, though not expressed in 
words. 
Contracts may be implied either in iaw or in fact. 
Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the fact.s 
and circumstancE.s of the case, and are not forma.Jly 
or explicitly stated in words. It is often said that 
the only difference between an express contract and 
a contract implied in fact is that in the former the 
parties arrjve at their agreement by words, whether 
oral or written, while in the latter their agreement 
is arrived at by a consideration of their acts and 
conduct, and that in both of the-e cases there ·s, in 
fact, a contract existing between the parties, t:1e 
only diffen'!nce being in the character of evidence 
necessary tn establish it. In other words, 'n an o.-
pre::s contPtct all the terms and con<.iitions are ex-
pressed between the parties, while in an implied con-
tract some one or more of the terms and condi-
tions are implied from the conduct of the pa.rties. 
The source of the obligaltion of express contracts and 
contracts implied in fact is the manifested intenrtion 
of the parties. An implied contract between two 
parties is raised only when the facts are such that 
an intent may fairly be inferred on their part to 
make such a contract. All the pertinent circumstan-
ces must be taken into consideration. 
According to authorities, an Agreement by conduct 
is jusit as binding as one made by words. Ahern vs. South 
Buffalo Railroad Company, 344 US 367. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has likewiE-e 
held that the interpretation of an oral agreement is ascer-
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tained by the meaning given to the words and manifestta.-
tion of the parties in determining their intent. Fuhriman 
Inc., vs. Jarrell 445 Pac. 2d 136. In the Fuhriman case an 
oral agreement was had between the parties involving rent 
on a home occupied by defendant, while builder was con-
~tructing defendant's home. The Supreme Court upheld 
the interpretation of the trial court, stating "that it is a 
duty of the trial court to determine the meaning to be given 
worc'.s and intention of the parties." 
In the instant case, there wa 1 adEquate evidence and 
te,timony to establish the intention of the parties and to 
justify the jury and their award for damages based upon 
the ag. eement of the parties. The figures on one invoice 
had been transposed and the change of $58.00 to $.58 was 
properly altered by the jury. The jury also credited de-
fendant with a counter and rug plaintiff removed at de-
fendant's request. 
In determining the issues involved the Supreme 
Court has the duty to review the evidence in light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings. Lynch v.s. McDon-
ald 367 Pac. 2d, 464. Weenig vs. Manning 262 Pac. 2d 491. 
Parrish vs.Tahtaras 318 Pac. 2d, 642. In quoting from 
Lynch vs. McDonald Supra, 
"While some of the testimony h aclmittedly in con-
flict and n0t in ccmplete harmony with testimony 
given in companion case, we find there ;s amp'e 
competent, sub-tantial, clear and convincing evi-
dence to sul)port the facts there:n." 
And the same is applicable to the instant ca-e. There is 
9 
ample competent, substantial, clea,r and convincing evidence 
to support the verdict of the trial jury and the judgment of 
the Court and neither, under the circumstances, should be 
disturbed. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT II. 
WAS DEFENDANT ABSOLVED FROM PAYING 
BECAUSE OF QUALITY OF THE WORK? 
The contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant wa; 
not breached by the Plaint'ff. Even if some of the J~_bor 
performed at the ('Xpres;.; request of the defendant, (Exs. 1, 
2, and 3) ; and if scme small repair item was not complet-
ed in the manner in which the defendant or his son or son-
' in-law would have completed it does not tend to breach the 
contract. So far as plaintiff could determine, the repairs, 
the labor and suppilies furnished to the portion of the pre-
mises not leased by the p1aintiff (Bradshaw Auto Parts 
and Motel room units) were completed as requested by de· 
fendant, and he acknowledge;; by ~tipulation (T 57-7) an 
amount owing of $179.18 for ;~id repairs. The repairs in 
the portion of the building being leased by plaintiff were to 
make it tenantable for the pla ·ntiff. Plaintiff testified 
that when he first discussed the proposed lease with the de· 
fend2nt, TR 3~ line 4, that the building was l0aded with 
junk, cans, lumber that had been torn out from the we .t 
end of the building where there had been a second floor. 
that there had bePn water damages through the ceiling- ti 
the Motel; th?.t th8 floor Wil<; black in cnlor fr0m previotH 
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waxing and stains; that partitions were required. All of 
these things were done as evidenced by Exhibits 6 & 7, and 
hours of work performed and invoices of materials furn-
i~hed, to satisfy the tenant (plaintiff). Under such cir-
n1mst:rnce :, Plaintiff could not have breached the contract 
and the payment for rent, which was due monthly, one-half 
in cash and one-half in labor was tendered when Pla:ntiff 
~ent defendant vo11cher" for materiah and supplies pur-
chasd for his building and credited the repairs on the non-
renta) unit with tte materia's and rnpplie~ to the defend-
ant. The defendant was requested to acknowledge and cre-
dit the plaintiff in his rent with th2 items above mentioned. 
Plaintiff had expended in labor and materials and supplies 
for the defendant's building in excess of $1980.87, and had 
received approximately three months rent. Plaintiff was 
not in default and the jury were justified in determining 
as they did in their verdict, that the rent was a proper 
off-set against supplies and materials purchased for the 
building in the sum of $708.71 a11d in repairs to both lea-ed 
and non-leased portion of the building. 
POINT NO. III. 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S QUANTUM MERUIT 
The defendant spends considerable time in his brief 
discmsing the submi-sion of the ca~e to the jury on quan-
tum meruit. Plaintiff submits that the ca ~e was submit-
ted to the jury on eYpres; and imp'ied contract clearly es-
tablished by the evidence with itemized evidence to justify 
the jury in their award, with the relp of three expert wit-
nesc.es who helped to etablish that wcrk had in fact been 
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done; the supplies and materials had in fact been furni.:hed 
and the value was in direct proportion to the itemized bill-
ing &ubmitted to the defendant by the plaintiff. 
Respondent repre .ents that the instructions of the 
Court No. 15, to which the defendant objects, to-wit: "If 
you should further find that the plaintiff provided labor 
and materials in remodeling and renovating clefenclant'" 
busine2s in an amount equal to or in execs., of the re;1t re-
quired, then you may find that the plaintiff wa3 not in de-
fault and would be ent tled tJ require the p2rforman~e d 
the defendant under the terms of the ag1 eem211t'', L a cc -
rect statement of the law. The jury could well find fr m 
the clear and convincing t:::stimony in the ca e that defem:-
and did c we ior the labor and materials furnished 
and from the evidence were justified in making an adjust-
menJt as they found from the evidence in offsetting the 
amount of plaintiff's award by correcting the transposition 
of figures on the invoice from $58.00 to $.58 (T 241-27) 
and were further justified by allowing defendant credit 
for some property removed from the building by the plain-
tiff at the instance of the de!'endant, if they in f::ict found 
that it was a proper item to be deducted frcm pla"ntiff's 
award. Hence the verdict cf $1,229.00 for total repairs 
and improvements (rather than $1,491.00 reque. t9d by the 
plaintiff) le· s $490.00 for rent, for a net venlict of $739.00. 
Defendant in hh brief excepts to t1e Court's in.-truc-
tions Nos. 16 & ?.0. The Court's in:tructi0n No. 16 iR n 
correc>t statement rif the law and the near ioentical ~urte is 
found in Williston on Contracts or in the restatement of 
the law of contracts, and as is so quoted herein. AM Jur 
2d, Vol. 17, pg. 334, 335. Also, ln::,truction No. 22 of the 
Court provides correctly for an offset and the jury correct-
ly interpreted the instruction and appJ:ed the law in grant-
ing the defendant full credit as offset again.,,t the repair3 
and improvements. 
POINT IV 
BILATERAL PERFORMANCE 
The further point rai:::ed in the Appellant's brief is 
that becau:oe $245.00 cash was not tendered to the defend-
ant for one-half of the rental, even though the plaintiff 
had performed $179.18 in labor on otlher prem[ses for the 
defendant, which defendant agreed to pay, and had pur-
chased materials and supplies from Peterson Machine Com-
pany, used in defendant's building at a cost of $708.71, 
that Plaintiff was barred from claiming the amount due 
him, because of Plaintiff's breach. Plaintfff alleges that 
with these sums due from the defendant in cash, that there 
was not such a breach of the agreement by the plaint' ff a• 
would permit Defendant to refuse to make payment for the 
labor and supplies furnished as a_<;;reed upcn by the parties. 
Where two or more performance3 are promised by 
each party. promises of one or m1re of the performances 
on each side may he promises for an agreed exchange. The 
Court was following the general rule of cm_ tructive con-
ditions in promises for an agreed exchange in the instruc-
tions to the Jury. A conci~e shtement of the law applic-
able is found in the re-statement of the law of contracts, 
Sec. 266, pg. 382, from which we quote. 
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"There can be no doubt that the parties consider not 
only their promise,s in a bilateral contract as ex-
changed for each other, but also consider the per-
formances promised as the subject of exchange. It 
cannot be supposed that parties would exchange un-
conditional promi:::es, each promise being the consid-
eration for the other, except on the as;;;umption that 
they regarded the respective performances as also 
subjects of exchange. When parties enter into an 
ordinary bilateral contract, therefore, they contem-
plate a double exchange, first an exchange of pro-
mises and later an exchange of performances. The 
performances are not necessarily to be rendered at 
the same time, but the price of an autcmobile to 
which a bilateral contract of purchase and sale re-
late;;; i3 the agreed exchange for the machir..e wheth-
er the pri2e is payable before or after delivery of the 
machine or at the same time. It is so generally true 
also that the performances to be exchanged are 
treated by the parties as of equivalent value that 
any exceptions are disregarded in favor of a uniform 
rule. 
The importance of the promises in a bilateral con· 
tract being promises for an agreed exchange is to 
produce a dependency between· the duties of the re-
spective parties. The result is in most respects the 
same as would be produced by inserting a require-
ment of the existence of appropriate condit:ons and, 
therefore, as matter of terminology, it might be said 
that such constructive conditions exist. There are, 
however, some consequences due to the promised e~­
change of performances which cannot without straJTI 
be describerl. as due to a requirement of the existence 
of constructive conditions." 
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The restatement of the law under subsection (3) of 
the same paragraph deals with divisible contracts where a 
contract is divisible by its terms. The performance of each 
par1-ff by one party is the agreed exchange for a corres-
ponding part by the other party. Quoting from the said 
Subsection (3): 
"If the performance of either party is inescapable 
of divLion interpretation is easy, but where perfor-
m'.lnce due is stated as a number of units, usage in 
the performance of s'milar contract> is frequently 
the only guide in determining whether these units 
are to be f'eparately performed as where the price 
promised for a piece of work is ten dollars a day, 
or for a quantity of lumber is $40 a thousand feet." 
Section 267, page 386 gives the principle in the fol-
lowing language : 
"Promises for an agreed exchange are concurrently 
conditional, unless a contrary intention i'> clearly 
manifested, if the promises can be simultaneously 
performed and the parties can be assured thart they 
are being so performed, where by the terms of the 
promises 
(a) the same time is fixed for the perform-
of each promise ; or 
(b) 3 fixed time i'> Ptated for the perform~nce 
of one of the promises and no time is fixed for 
the other; or 
( c) no time is fixed for the performance of 
either promise ; or 
15 
(d) the same period of time is fixed within 
which each promise shall be performed. 
a. The treatment of promises as concurrently con. 
ditional is favored since each party is protected 
by the privilege of withholding his performance un-
til he receives performance by the other party. HmY 
far such conditions are constructive rather than 
based on an interpretation of the marnifested inten-
tion of the parties may be $Ubject to dispute, and 
the answer may differ in different kinds of con-
tracts. In Rome kinds long urnge of treating prom-
ise.3 falling within the rules of the Sedion as concur-
rently conditional has now resulted in making the 
inference natural and perhaps nece~sary that the 
partie3 int~nded simultaneous performar:cc, :, 11.i 
that neither performance should be rendered unless 
the other is also. It is immaterial, however, whether 
such an intention is manifested. Justice requires 
the result unless a contrail'~ initention is clearly 
manifested." 
Based upon this long accepted principle the defend· 
ant in the instant case cannot argue that lack of perform· 
ance by the plaintiff had breached the Contract where de-
fendant was required to perform concurrently on his agree· 
ment to pay for certain improvements, materials, supplies 
and repairs. 
1 fi 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Respondent re-
spectfully requests this Court to affirm and uphold the 
verdict of the trial jury, and the judgment of the trial 
Court a3 being triers of the fact in the best position to 
determine the crerlability of the testimony and the suffic-
iency of the evidence to justify the award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
I' 
